



Special Session on Somalia





Throughout Somalia's history, the one consistent thing within the nation seems to be the political instability and inconsistency of leadership. In the past two decades this grave instability has paved the way for effective anarchy in the nation. In fact, there has not been peace in the nation since Mohamed Siad Barre, the dictator of 22 years, was ousted by warlords in 1991. Following this coup, the warlords turned on each other in bloody civil war, which left thousands of civilians dead. The first post-dictatorship government was established in 1991, yet by 1992, a United Nations peacekeeping force was forced to step in to restore order and safety.ⁱ However, the situation continued to deteriorate and the peacekeepers were forced to leave the region in 1995.ⁱⁱ The current government is the seventeenth attempt to set up centralized governance in the nation in the past eighteen years amidst grave difficulties. On April 25th, 2009, the Somali parliament was attacked just as the Prime Minister and Speaker of the House were leaving session. While all the parliament members are said to be safe, there were many known innocent civilian casualties.ⁱⁱⁱ

This attack comes at a grave juncture for Somalia. Just two days prior, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the opposition leader, returned to the country for the first time since 2006 and ominously stated that Islamists would continue to fight against the official government. In particular, Aweys has threatened not to hold any further deliberations with the current leadership unless African Union (AU) peacekeepers are sent out of the region. Approximately 4,300 AU peacekeepers have been working towards stability in the region, despite constant attacks. on their lives.^{iv}

The lack of government control has perpetuated the violence and lawlessness in the region. Finally, widespread poverty along with the potentially lucrative piracy trade has led to an increase of international piracy, with hijackings across the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Pirate attacks have not only increased in number, but have also increased in severity and sophistication. These attacks are in direct opposition to international maritime law, as established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.^v For the international community this translates into a significant risk to maritime safety, as well as a financial strain on global shipping industry.^{vi}

Interim Government

President Siad Barre, who gained power upon the assassination of President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke on October 15, 1969, left Somalia in January of 1991, leaving the nation with no functional government to speak of from late January of 1991 through August of 2000.^{vii} Instead the nation was left in the hands of numerous clan-affiliated guerrilla organizations, which governed under a regime of mutual mistrust. Thus, Somalia effectively fell to anarchy. Although peace negotiations were attempted between the estranged factions, they were ineffective and independent warlords ruled the nation in chaos. The various warlords soon began establishing sub-states including the Somaliland Republic, Puntland, and Jubaland.^{viii} While the states lacked international recognition, they reestablished relative security in the nation, which had been embroiled in turmoil





for so long. This relative stability lasted nearly a decade, until a parliamentary system was established through international meetings in Djibouti in 2000.^{ix}

In spite of seemingly greater stability within the nation, the story on the international front was quite different. At the time of the Third Djibouti Peace Conference (2000), many of the opposition leaders either completely refused to attend the talks, or were convinced to attend only through the auspices of Ethiopia. The end result of this meeting was an effective continuation of Manifesto leadership, with many of the attending opposition leaders ultimately acquiescing to a reestablished version of President Barre's Manifesto government under the leadership of Abdiqasim Salad Hassan and Ali Galaydh. In spite of high hopes by the delegates at the Third Djibouti Peace Conference, the government ultimately alienated many other nations and cut ties with traditional leadership as well as the civil society, whose members became much like the Intellectual classes of Eastern Europe in the early 1990's. This Transitional National Government ultimately reached its end in 2003 without formally establishing control over a unified Somalia. In fact, the government controlled only about ten percent of the country by the time it was disbanded.^x

By October 2004, a new Transitional Parliament was created with a term of five years, and President Abdullahi Yusuf was elected in September. While President Yusuf's government was officially endorsed by the Somali Parliament, opposition leaders, including Sherif Hassan Adan (the Speaker of the Parliament at the time) continued to call for Yusuf's impeachment.

Although Yusuf was originally the president of Puntland, his government was forced to govern from Kenya for the first year due to the seemingly unending violence and instability in Somalia, particularly in and around the capital of Mogadishu. No less influential was the unexpected move by Mogadishu warlords, who in a surprise show of allegiance to opposition leaders, denied the government haven in the traditional capital. Thus, since the Transitional Federal Government first moved back to Somalia in June, the headquarters were first placed in Jowhar, and ultimately moved to Baidoa. Yet, the TFG was accepted by a majority of Somali's and approved by the National Reconciliation Council.^{xi} This led to the creation of a Supreme Court of Somalia as well as regional councils to direct local politics. However, as regional clan governance maintained its hold upon many of the regions, the TFG was unable to gain control over the whole of the nation.

Unfortunately, only two years later, in May of 2006, fighting between the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC) and rival warlords ushered in the worst violence in the country in the past 10 years.^{xii} By June 6, the SICC took over control of the Mogadishu capital and gained control of much of Southern Somalia. While President Yusuf's government attempted months of peace talks with the SICC, these talks were largely unsuccessful. The Transitional Government was only successful in regaining control of Mogadishu upon the completion of the Ethiopian air raids against Somali Islamists that Ethiopia considered a significant threat to their national security.^{xiv} Approximately a week after the commencement of Ethiopian fighting, most of the Islamist





sympathizers were forced out of the country. However, Ethiopia quickly announced that its troops would not leave the nation until they were sure of Somalia's stability under a functioning centralized government! After a decade and a half of anarchy, the nation was ready for some real progress towards stability. Even so, fighting between Somali and Ethiopian troops against the insurgents deepened in March, and over three hundred civilians were left dead. The fighting quickly deteriorated into a humanitarian crisis, as hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled Mogadishu to get away from the fighting. The transitional government made another attempt at reconciliation in July, starting a National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu, however they were forced to close down as key opposition leaders refused to attend.^{xv}

In June 2008, Islamist leaders along with the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia, and the Transitional Government decided on a cease-fire agreement.^{xvi} One of the prerequisites for this agreement was the replacement of Ethiopian troops by United Nations peacekeepers. However, considering previous events in the nation, which was considered unsafe for peacekeepers, it was doubtful whether the United Nations would be able to requisition troops to stabilize the environment. Further, as with past peacekeeping efforts, several of the opposition leaders refused to take part in negotiations. By October of 2008, even the previously peaceful, northern regions of Somalia were not out of the way of violence. Over two-dozen citizens were murdered as five suicide-bombers rocked the region, with the highest death toll hitting Somaliland, which had previously

declared independence.^{xvii}

The Transitional Government was hit hard by the violence, and not only did Prime Minister Ali Muhammed Ghedi resign in October 2007, but President Yusuf further dismissed Ghedi's successor, Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein in December of 2008, claiming he did not accomplish his job.^{xviii} However, President Yusuf did not have Parliament's approval to dismiss Hussein. Despite the parliament's clear opposition to his move, President Yusuf appointed a new Prime Minister, Muhammad Mahmud Guled Gamadhare. However, Guled^{xix} also resigned as, ultimately, did President Yusuf.^{xx}

2008 came to a close, and 2009 began without a President in office. Yet, Ethiopia began loosening its hold upon Somalia and diminishing troops in the nation by January. Thus, on January 31st, 2009 the Parliament elected President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad in a move that many Somalis believed would lead to a lasting peace in the nation. By February, President Ahmad had named a new Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, whose nomination was upheld by parliament and the people. Many felt that Sharmarke^{xxi} would be instrumental in garnering international support for the newly established Somali government.

The Opposition

The opposition in Somalia generally consists of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), looking to establish political authority in Somalia under Sharia law^{xxii}. Although the ICU originally agreed to take part in peace talks with the





Transitional Federal Government, these peace-talks ultimately deteriorated due to tension between the two parties. Both parties claimed that international bodies were interfering on behalf of the other side by providing military and civilian support. The Transitional Federal Government argued that international terrorists were supporting the ICU, alongside nations such as Eritria.^{xxiii} Meanwhile, the Islamic Courts Union claimed that Ethiopian forces had bolstered the Transitional Government's efforts in seizing control of the nation.

In April of 2009, one of the highest-ranking opposition leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys returned from exile in Eritrea^{xxiv}, to which he had fled when Ethiopian troops gained control of Mogadishu back from the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Although his return was viewed with enthusiasm, as many believed it would signify a great step towards the reconciliation process between the various factions of Somali leadership, it has so far had mixed results. While Aweys has publicly proclaimed his support for Somalia's acceptance of Islamic law, he claims that in a government supported by the likes of the United States it is unclear whether or not the government would fully implement such laws. Although Aweys had originally served in the Islamic Courts Union with President Ahmed, Aweys has continued to oppose the current regime, while members of President Ahmed's faction aligned themselves within Somalia's parliament.

Meanwhile, Sheik Aweys is pushing for the withdrawal of all African Union peacekeepers in the nation. He has claimed that no peaceful negotiations, between his opposition forces and the current government leadership would take place

until African Union troops are gone. Until such time, Aweys has pledged that insurgents would continue to attack AU forces just as they fought against the Ethiopian forces in the past.^{xxv}

Further opposition forces include the clan leadership that has existed in various parts of Somalia for many years. Clan-based divisions have been firmly ingrained in Somali civil and legal society, with various clans broken down into sub-clans along extended familial lines. Initially, the Islamic opposition attempted to reunify the nation under the common religion of Islam, thereby suppressing divisive clan orientations, yet this attempt was not entirely successful and the Islamic rebellion, along with ICU policies, were ultimately put down by the Transitional Government with the aid of international troops. In 2007, the interim government, yet again, proposed the allocation of parliamentary seats and governmental posts based on clan-lines, but such a clan-based system has been attempted in the past and failed, arguably because such a system necessarily perpetuates divisive clan-rivalries.^{xxvi}

African Union Mission in Somalia

As security continued to deteriorate within Somalia, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) along with the African Union, announced their plan to establish the Peace Support Mission to Somalia. This mission was meant to establish security for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) along with the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) to allow the TFG to move safely back into the country. Further, the mission was to train police and military forces





in order to hand over law enforcement to Somali-run security forces as soon as possible. This mission was endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in February of 2005, and as little as a week later, the first Fact-Finding Mission was established to initiate the proposal of a mandate for the ultimate Peace Support Mission.^{xxvii} However, the mission was unable to deploy until 2006. Yet, by July 2006, the second IGAD/AU mission^{xxviii} began holding political talks with the Transitional Federal Government, the Islamic Courts Union, as well as civil and traditional leaders in the country in order to finalize the mission's plan. This led to a mission mandated for a period of six months, with the ultimate goal of handing over control of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations to the United Nations. However, the mandate was ultimately extended.

As the international community began calling on Ethiopia to remove troops from Somalia, a call was made to the African Union to replace Ethiopian troops in aiding the Transitional Federal Government. Thus, it was ultimately arranged that the African Union would deploy the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This mission was mandated on January 19th, 2007 to assist in humanitarian aid distribution while training Somali security forces and supporting Transitional Government institutions.^{xxix}

The return of Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys in April, 2009 has, yet again, brought into question the fates of the African Union peacekeeping forces that first began accumulating in the nation in March of 2007. While Islamist factions have continuously claimed that they will fight against

any peacekeepers present in the country, the peacekeeping force gradually grew from a mere 30 Ugandan peacekeepers on March 1st, 2007, to over 5200 troops today, particularly from Uganda and Burundi.^{xxx}

International Piracy

The Somali Perspective

The Somali perspective on the piracy issue is quite different from the general perception abroad. Somalis claim that piracy began in the nation as an organized response to foreign vessels coming to Somali coasts and utilizing the waters around Somalia to dump waste and fish. Somali citizens saw these actions as stealing and fought back. Of course, in a poor nation such as Somalia, ransoms from pirated ships quickly turned quite lucrative.

With the fall of centralized government in 1991 and a disruption of economic standards due to the civil war that has plagued the nation ever since, piracy expanded into a business. Meanwhile, multiple caches of small arms, and later heavier weaponry came to civilian hands. While these civilian brigades were initially slated to form militias in order to replace the army and police forces, which had taken over the government, they ultimately succumbed to the lawlessness already going on around them. Numerous human rights abuses were enacted, and arbitrary murders of civilians took place on the streets daily.

International Response





The Somali Piracy trade has already greatly affected international maritime shipping and security. As recently as the summer of 2009, American and Russian vessels were hijacked in the turbulent waters off of the Horn of Africa. In fact, it is estimated that an average of over 350 ships have been hijacked per year with millions of dollars being extorted annually as ransom for each of these vessels.

The pirates have brazenly disregarded the Law of the Seas, particularly those specified by part VII United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas. Thus, the pirates are in direct violation of international law and should be prosecuted as such. This is not to mention the direct affront to other nations, including the United States and the Russian Federation, through the indiscriminant seizure of their shipping vessels in recent months. Nations have responded by sending forces into the region to regain control of their ships and ultimately arrest those responsible, with mixed results.

A Note to Delegates:

Although piracy has been an important issue in international politics, this committee will focus upon the underlying instability within Somalia including the humanitarian crisis in the region. Although the chairs expect piracy to be an issue in your arguments, please do not focus on it exclusively.

Security Council Resolutions: 1991-Present

In 1992, a delegation from Somalia was invited to participate in Security Council deliberations regarding the situation in the country. Although the delegation did not have voting rights in the Council, this was a huge step towards United Nations activities on the Somalian front. The Security Council quickly resolved to make a concerted effort towards international peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in Somalia.^{xxxii} Since that time, approximately thirty-one resolutions have been ratified in regards to the situation in the country. By April, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had appointed a Special Representative on the situation in Somalia^{xxxiii} and began actively working within the international community to promote and enact a lasting peace. Further, Resolution 733 imposed an arms embargo on the nation. Finally, in July, Resolution 767 called for cooperation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Organization of African Unity as well as establishing four regions of operation for UNOSOM^{xxxiv}. Subsequent 1992 resolutions continued to expand the Somali mission, consistently urging states to provide further aid.

By March 11th through 13th of 1993, the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia was held in Addis Ababa. Later that month, on March 26th, 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 814^{xxxv} commending humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia and promoting reconciliation efforts in addition to the establishment of a Transitional Government authority, with regional administration, in the hopes of promoting peace





and security in the nation. While condemning continuing violence against peacekeepers, this resolution urged for an expansion of humanitarian aid efforts through the work of the Secretary General and all relevant U.N. bodies. Finally, it called upon the Charter of the United Nations in expanding the UNOSOM force, while encouraging UNITAF efforts towards the disarmament of Somali militias. Yet, in spite of these efforts, by June the Security Council was forced to pass resolution 837^{xxxvi}, condemning violent, premeditated attacks carried out by members of the United Somali Congress, as well as acrid radio messages aimed at inciting violence against foreign aid workers. This resolution further reaffirmed convictions towards the disarmament of Somalia after such grave attacks.

In spite of some positive changes in Somali security, attacks against UNOSOM officials continued, and later 1993 resolutions, such as Resolution 865^{xxxvii} continued to condemn such violence while attempting to reaffirm the need for a reestablishment of order through justice and police organizations. The Council continued to call upon all factions within Somalia to work towards a peaceful reconciliation and a reestablishment of penal and judiciary institutions while calling on all United Nations member states to facilitate these ends. By the end of the year, UNOSOM's mandate had been extended two more times^{xxxiv}, and a Commission of Inquiry had been established in order to facilitate continued investigations into attacks against UNOSOM personnel^{xxxv}. UNOSOM was extended three more times in 1994.^{xxxvi}

When the United States pulled out of Somalia in 1995, the UNOSOM mission in

Somalia was also withdrawn, and no new resolutions were adopted on the matter until 2001. At this point, Resolutions 1356 and 1407 were ratified, which reaffirmed the arms embargo established on Somalia in 1992^{xxxvii}. A Panel of Experts was subsequently established, and re-commissioned the following year under Resolution 1474^{xxxviii}. Finally, this Panel was expanded into a Monitoring Unit and the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons^{xxxix}. Although most subsequent resolutions focused on the implementation of the arms embargo, with the requisite expansions of the Monitoring Group, they reaffirmed international determination and support for the Transitional Federal Institutions and urged a continuation of Somali peace talks. Finally, IGASOM was recommended through the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), along with the African Union mission, to Somalia in December of 2006^{xxxv}. In spite of this recommendation, the mission could not be established before the Transitional Federal Government, along with Ethiopian troops, began fighting the Islamic Courts Union once again, and ultimately defeated them by January 2007.

As 2007 began, the UNSC continued to stress its support for AMISOM by urging member states to provide AMISOM with necessary supplies, personnel, and funding.^{xxxvi} Meanwhile, the arms embargo was redefined in order to ensure that all necessary supplies for the training of police forces, as well as for the peacekeeping missions, were not disrupted. Finally, with significant attacks upon maritime shipping around the Horn of Africa





coast, the Security Council focused upon passing resolutions aimed at condemning and abating such attacks. Despite working with the Transitional Federal Government, as well as promoting the International Maritime Organization as stated in the Convention and as applicable to piracy in particular, attacks continued against American, French, and Russian ships, among others. States that were able to deploy naval vessels and aircraft for the deterrence of piracy were encouraged to do so by the Council, while those known to have allowed breaches of the embargo, as well as piracy, had their accounts frozen.

Bloc Positions

North America

In 1992, the United States sent troops into Somalia in order to safeguard food deliveries to famine victims. However, by May of 1993, the United Nations had taken over delivery protection. The United States was instrumental in leading U.N. programs under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in 1993. However, violent attacks by warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid led to a large number of American casualties in Mogadishu and led to great enmity from the U.S. This also signaled a drastic change in U.S. policy towards aiding Somalia. By late March, U.S. troops had completely left the country, leaving United Nations troops in their place. However, this ultimately led to a deterioration, not only of the UNITAF mission, but also of UNOSOM I and II by the end of March 1995.

In January of 2007, the United States launched air strikes against Islamists retreating from the Ethiopian-Somali fighting. While the United States claimed that this group of Islamists contained members of al-Qaeda suspected in previous attacks on Americans, the strikes were criticized by many Muslim nations. In May 2009, the United States facilitated the formation of the Contact Group on Piracy in New York.

European Union

Since 2006, the European Union has been the major aid donor to Somalia. In December of 2006, Commissioner Louis Michel spearheaded the Memorandum of Understanding in order to facilitate the peace process by encouraging talks between President Yusuf, Prime Minister Gedi, the speaker of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament, and Sheik Aweys. This Memorandum was also created as a commitment to peaceful negotiations through the Khartoum process. The E.U remains among the biggest aid donors to the Somali government, and worked extensively to promote the Khartoum peace process along with key nations within the League of Arab States^{xxxxvii}

In April of 2009, José Manuel Durao Barraso, the President of the European Commission, was quoted as saying that “We will not end piracy on the high seas of Somalia unless we bring development to the towns and villages,” highlighting the main goals of the European Union in the Somali region^{xxxxviii} However, while championing development goals, European aid workers have been seized time and again by Somalis. Thus, the European Commission has





expressed grave concerns regarding the seizure of aid workers. European nations have also been instrumental in fighting piracy on the high seas, particularly with extensive shows of military power.

Middle East

The League of Arab States has been a strong supporter of peace talks between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union. Although initial negotiations, held in Khartoum, Sudan, did not yield hoped-for results, the integration of the two groups into the current government structure has been viewed favorably by Islamic nations in the Middle East. By December of 2008, the Arab League held a special session on Somalia in which they reaffirmed and upheld the Djibouti Agreement as well as the AMISOM mission to Somalia. Finally, the members of the Arab League pledged both material and military aid towards the stabilization of the Somali Army ^{xxxxix}.

African

The African Union (AU) has been instrumental in holding peacekeeping operations within Somalia, with various AU nations sponsoring negotiations as early as 1991.

Ultimately, the African Union established the AMISOM mission, which meant to take control of Somalia from Ethiopian troops, in order to ultimately lead the way towards a United Nations mission in the country. This mission has been extended multiple times in the last eighteen years and continues to this day.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was mandated as a “Peace Support Operation” in order to promote stability and national security in the region. They originally took over the operation from Ethiopian Forces in 2008, in preparation for a full United Nations takeover. Although the AU mission has yet to expire, the opposition leaders continue to push for AU withdrawal from Somalia as a precondition for any reprisal of peacekeeping talks.

Asia:

The main Asian concern in the Somali region is the affect of Somali piracy upon pirates in and around the Malacca Straits. Although Somalia has gotten more news coverage in recent years, due to sensational piracy attacks around its coast, much of the world’s piracy has traditionally been found in the seas around Indonesia and Japan.

Meanwhile, Asian nations have strongly supported the increases in AMISOM’s forces, in order to maintain stability within the nation, as well as the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement.



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These resignations were in large part due to disagreements over whether the TFG should hold talks with the Islamic Courts Union.

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