



2001 Afghanistan Invasion





1. The situation today: “Scene Setter”

As of today, 8 December 2001, in collaboration with Northern Alliance forces, the majority of Afghanistan is under American control. All major cities in the country are secure and stabilized by US Special Forces and Marines. In order to increase manpower in the region, a number of European allies have also deployed troops into Afghanistan. As well, a UN Peacekeeping mission is underway and expected to be deployed by mid-to-late December. If evident, any open engagement with enemies will be a minor threat as our military strength far outweighs that of the Taliban. Finally, Mullah Omar has indicated that the last Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan, Kandahar, will be surrendered.

A large number of al-Qaeda and Taliban members are fleeing to the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. CIA sources, among others, point to Osama Bin Laden being in a fortified cave complex in the White Mountains southeast of Kabul named *Tora Bora*. The US will be responsible for providing air support and reconnaissance support to the anti-Taliban forces that we will be cooperating with in this battle. As well, we expect some additional manpower for this mission from European allies that also have troops in Afghanistan. Capturing Bin Laden is critical to the mission in Afghanistan, and this upcoming battle in the mountains is extremely important in the success of the war itself. We will also be supported by a number of tribal forces as well. In the Tora Bora mission, we expect support from United Islamic Front or Northern Alliance soldiers. The Department of Defense believes we can expect continued support from UIF throughout “Operation

Enduring Freedom” and in our future presence in Afghanistan.

2. Objectives for an Afghanistan end-state

Sustainable Security Institutions

The objectives for the reconstruction of Afghanistan are hotly debated, within the Pentagon and the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus on what characteristics a reconstructed Afghanistan will have. In particular, a stable security situation is critical. “Stable” is still a convoluted term – there are no clear metrics that have been developed by the United States to define a “stable” situation. Scholars point to a new concept, known as “Security Sector Reform” (Smith 2001) which refers to the development of military and police institutions that are sustainable, governed domestically and self-sufficient to the point where they require minimal support from international interveners. Such a set of institutions in Afghanistan would be ideal – and thus, any policies for Afghanistan’s reconstruction should be mindful of the issues involved in security sector reform.

Security sector reform literature suggests the development of institutions governed by the state. In particular, there should be a general focus on creating strong and legitimate police forces (Neild 2001) and an Afghan national military that is equipped to sufficiently handle threats from other forces. Most importantly, the police forces and national military should be the only bodies legitimized to use lethal force on the population. Thus, the disarmament of any other non-state groups is crucial. Logically, this suggests that Al-





Qaeda and the Taliban are to be disarmed. However, it is unrealistic to expect the Taliban or Al-Qaeda to come to a negotiation table regarding disarmament, thus alternative methods of addressing two strong, armed groups in Afghanistan must be considered. All the same, the ultimate goal of a security sector reform and institution building process must end with a national Afghan military and a police system that is viewed as legitimate by the population and the only bodies with the capability to use lethal force.

Preventing a counter-insurgency

The Department of Defense expects that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda will regroup and begin launching counter-attacks as American and Coalition forces attempt to reconstruct Afghanistan. The most important task of this committee for long-term stability in Afghanistan will be to eliminate these groups' ability to launch counter attacks. Paul Collier, a major scholar in rebel actor theory and development, suggests that actors, such as these two in question, will respond to utility functions, or profit from war. According to the theory, if the costs of going to war are higher than the profits from control of the State, then the actors will not go to war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Obviously, there are huge profits (both ideological and material) (Neild 2001) to the Taliban controlling the Afghan State, thus there is a tendency for an enemy group to attempt to stay in control of Afghanistan. The Taliban operates on an ideological basis as well, so there should be an assumption that they will do anything possible to continue their fight to take back control of Afghanistan. Thus, according to Collier and Hoeffler's theory, the only way to reduce the

propensity of the Taliban or other enemy organization to war is to eliminate any source of funding that they have, so they have minimal war-making capacity. Addressing their recruitment ability as well is important in reducing the capacity of the Taliban. Most importantly, elimination of the leaders, according to Department of Defense speculation, will not necessarily destroy the Taliban. In fact, if the leaders are killed, there may be some fragmentation of the existing structure of the Taliban and smaller groups may develop, competing with each other and American and Coalition forces.

Economic Recovery

Economic development in Afghanistan is a relatively well-researched field. A variety of solutions have been discussed in academic circles. The American role in this area should be to facilitate the development of institutions that can foster economic growth. Department of State, particularly USAID, should take the lead in development policy that is compatible with Department of Defense and CENTCOM requirements. Any policies developed should be approved as a whole throughout the committee. In order to facilitate economic growth, Department of State should actively be lobbying the IMF and World Bank to provide loans for projects that it decides to sponsor as well as encouraging American businesses to invest in Afghanistan. OPIC (Overseas Private Insurance Corporation) can be persuaded to provide low-cost risk insurance policies to incentivize potential investment. The World Bank also has a similar program in its MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) and can be lobbied to provide





similar benefits. It is crucial that the Department of State actively develop policies, incentives and institutions that encourage private investment and other capital flows into Afghanistan.

Human Rights Development

America should lead the way, when possible, to ensure that the human rights legacy of the Taliban is reversed. It is crucial to the success of the mission that the Afghan people perceive American forces as liberators. In order to develop such a perception, American forces should observe human rights laws (except in cases where such behavior may threaten the operation) and limit the number of civilian casualties. More importantly, the government that we help the Afghans set up must strictly observe human rights norms in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the new state. However, it is inevitable that deviations from the norms will be necessary in the formation of an Afghan state, and therefore, scholars have argued, that the media and NGOs must not be fully informed of all the activities of the state (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Any information that can easily tarnish the human rights record of the state should therefore be kept secret.

The United States should also provide technical assistance in the design of policies and the funding of projects that buttress human rights in Afghanistan. A major symbolic step would be to provide educational facilities and vocational training for the women and girls in Afghanistan. Extending education opportunities throughout the country should be a priority. Healthcare access as well should be a priority. The means to deliver this exists through our existing soldiers, providing basic first aid to those who need it and limited

access to doctors when possible. This is a major step towards “winning the hearts and minds” of the population, which reinforces the perception of Americans in a positive light.

Rule of Law Reform

The process of reforming the police, legal, judicial and prison sector of Afghanistan is extremely important in determining the legitimacy of the new Afghan state. The United States should actively support the development of legal and judicial institutions by providing training for judges. An option that has been used in UN missions is the establishment during post-conflict transition is the use of third party, trained international judges to arbitrate cases. If the funding is available, this is certainly an option for Afghanistan if sufficient judges do not exist. The police must be monitored carefully in order to make sure that they are not abusing the population or violating human rights in their work. This is one of the quickest ways for the validity of the state to be undermined, thus, governance and accountability in the police is important. Rule of Law reform, should, in general focus on the elimination of corruption in all sectors of the government, as corruption has major implications in the long run for the success of democracy.

Democratization

The creation of a sustainable democracy that does not harbor terrorism is the ultimate goal in the state building process in Afghanistan. This will require an election, fully monitored by independent international observers. When to implement an election is a particularly convoluted question, as many elections in the past have led to intense political violence. As a symbolic gesture,





elections can send a powerful message to the population and international community that Afghanistan is on a new course. However, if done too early, violence could erupt due to competition between factions in the country. Thus, it makes sense that no elections can take place prior to complete disarmament. This may not be completely feasible; however, all strong political pressure will make early elections necessary.

This list of goals is by no means comprehensive. It sets out the basic problems that the Special Defense Council should expect to face, as well as some basic solutions that can address them. However, there are many ways to address each of these objectives, each with major consequences as well as unique advantages. It is the job of the committee to design creative solutions that maximize advantages with consequences that do not jeopardize the work of other departments in the mission in Afghanistan. Thus, all policy design will be a collaborative effort, requiring a realistic understanding of the situation on the ground and a variety of policy perspectives. Most importantly, the committee must critically analyze any potential policies and the side effects they may cause. Finally, the United States cannot bear the entire financial burden; therefore, it is necessary that the Department of State (with help from other departments and government bodies) lobby donors, Bretton Woods institutions and other states to take active financial roles in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

3. A few words on the committee and a list of those involved in the “Special Defense Council”

This committee will not function as a normal crisis committee. While the chairs expect

that you will respond to crisis situations that are presented by our staff, it is necessary that delegates come prepared with some understanding of the situation and ideas for policies, within the scope of the government department, which they will be representing. I expect the committee to come with ideas on what steps to take as of “today” (12/8/2001), as Afghanistan at this time is effectively a blank slate and the actions of delegates can drive the direction of the country. Because of this, I ask that you **do not** research the individual policies of the specific person you will represent, but rather you research the authorities, responsibilities and perspectives of your character’s title. For example, Secretary of State Powell will need to be focused on encouraging donors to invest, lobbying the World Bank, IMF and Donors and dealing with any diplomatic issues that may arise in the region and international community. General Tommy Franks, on the other hand, will be focused on developing strategic policies for the US Military in Afghanistan, creating policy on counter-insurgency tactics and other military-specific issues. Thus, delegates will be able to take on the position of Secretary of State and simulate the office (or whatever position they are assigned), rather than the person. Also, the simulation will be less crisis-driven. By this, I mean that delegates will not constantly be responding to crises, but rather designing (during committee) the best possible pathways to achieving objective that the background guide and committee sets out. However, crisis situations will occur, and responding to them is necessary. This committee, all the same, expects that delegates will not require crises to catalyze debate—delegates are expected to





have policies they would like to debate and implement as soon as they enter the committee room. Thus, this simulation will be a mix of a general assembly in that its primary focus is to create policies, but the policies must be created to respond to an ever-changing situation in

Afghanistan, at the pace of a crisis simulation. Please refer to the following list in order to find what department your character falls under and to see who else will be in the Special Defense Council:

Department of State/Diplomacy Positions

- Secretary (Colin Powell)
- UN Ambassador (John Negroponte)
- Ambassador to Pakistan (Wendy Chamberlin)
- Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs (Christina Rocca)
- USAID Administrator (Andrew Natsios)
- US Permanent Representative to NATO (R. Nicholas Burns)

Department of Defense

- Secretary (Donald Rumsfeld)
- Deputy Secretary (Paul Wolfowitz)
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Richard B. Myers)
- Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Peter Pace)
- CENTCOM Combatant Commander (Gen. Tommy Franks)

Central Intelligence Agency

- Director (George Tenet)
- Deputy Director (John McLaughlin)

National Security Council

The crisis director should be able to convene these people at any time to discuss threats to the homeland and crucial updates too – they will be pulled out of committee. They will be updated on any crisis situations that occur and will have privileged information that they can choose to share or refuse to share with the rest of the committee.

National Security Advisor (Condoleezza Rice)

Secretary of the Treasury (Paul O'Neill)

Secretary of State, above (Colin Powell)

Secretary of Defense, above (Donald Rumsfeld)

The President and Vice President will not be represented by delegates

Policy Advisors (these people provide independent opinions to the rest of the body, they have no decision-making power but the council will look to them for accurate analysis and policy ideas, giving them a significant amount of clout in the committee).





Democracy & Elections Advisor
Regional Security Advisor
Human Rights Advisor
Development & Economics Advisor
Rule of Law Advisor

